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Abstract 
 
Farming has a long cultural tradition in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) but today it is 
affected by the Israeli occupation. This thesis investigates how different agricultural actors in the 
West Bank frame farming as a practice and what collective action frames they have developed 
connected to their understanding of farming. The aim is to illuminate how these different actors 
construct meaning around the practice of farming, and how people can understand and use 
farming in different ways. Some of my informants clearly link farming practices to a bigger 
symbolism of farming as a practice of resistance against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian 
territories. Little attention has been given to the non-violent resistance in the occupied Palestinian 
territories and esspecially to farming as a tool of resistance. However, not all of my informants 
align the same symbolism to the practice of farming, as for some of the informants it is 
considered to be foremost a coping strategy. 
This research contributes to the discussion around the the concept of food sovereignty. Different 
scholars have addressed the existence of contradictions inside the food sovereignty movement 
since different contexts have different understandings of or implementation-approaches to the 
concept. In Palestine, the idea of food sovereignty is becoming more popular as part of the non-
violent resistance movement, and the study reveals how some actor’s link patriotic interests to 
ideas of (silent) food sovereignty. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
Agriculture is an integral component of Palestinian communal, cultural, economic 
and social life. To date, agriculture has remained of great significance to Palestinians 
and their identity and culture, to which land and crops are central. 
Over and above their traditional roles in the generation of income, employment and 
food, land and agriculture have come to symbolize Palestinian resilience and 
perseverance in the face of ongoing land loss due to prolonged occupation and the 
expansion of Israeli settlements. (UNCTAD, 2015, p.1) 
 
 
In Palestine, farming has a long cultural tradition, but is now suffering from the Israeli occupation 
(World Bank, 2013). Since 1967, the West Bank is under Israeli occupation. The occupation 
has political, economic and social impacts on the lives of the Palestinians in the West Bank 
occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). The Palestinian resistance movement is enduring since 
long before 1967 but the two Intifadas1 (1987-1993; 2000-2005) have dominated the public 
picture of Palestinian resistance as being mostly of violent character. Little attention has been 
given to non- violent approaches and especially perspectives that explores farming as a tool of 
resistance. This thesis investigates how different agricultural actors in the West Bank frame 
farming as a practice and what collective action frames they have developed connected to their 
understanding of farming. The aim is to illuminate how these different actors construct meaning 
around the practice of farming, and thereby, to give an example of how people understand and 
use farming in different ways. Additionally, this research contributes to the discussion around 
the concept of local context in food sovereignty, as the idea of food sovereignty is becoming 
more popular in the oPt as part of the Palestinian resistance movement. Food sovereignty is here 
defined as “the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food, and their right to 
define their own food and agriculture systems” (Nyéléni, 2007, p.1). 
This thesis is based on qualitative data obtained during a field trip to the West Bank in 
January 2018. Participant observation, semi-structured interviews and a focus group discussion 
were the three methods I used in the field. Additionally, document analysis was used for 
contextualisation of the data. 
                                                             
1 Intifada is Arabic for uprising. 
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2. Research Questions 
 
This thesis focuses on answering the following two research questions. 
 
1.   What kind of collective action frames have different agricultural actors in the occupied 
 
West Bank developed in connection to the practice of farming? 
 
2.   How do their frames differentiate and/or relate to each other regarding the way they make 
sense of the practice of farming? 
 
3. Research Problem 
 
The food sovereignty movement is regarded to be the largest peasant movement of current times 
(Desmairais, 2007; Martínez-Torres and Rosset, 2010). The movement presents itself and is 
often considered in academia to be an alternative to the neo-liberal structures that dominate the 
current global food system (c.f. La Vía Campesina, 2018; Martínez-Torres and Rosset, 2010; 
Desmarais, 2007; McMichael, 2013; Clapp, 2016). La Vía Campestina (LVC)2, one of the most 
famous representatives of the food sovereignty movement, defines the concept in the following 
way: 
 
 
Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food 
produced through sustainable methods and their right to define their own food and 
agriculture systems. It develops a model of small-scale sustainable production 
benefiting communities and their environment. Food sovereignty prioritizes local food 
production and consumption, giving a country the right to protect its local producers 
from cheap imports and to control its production. It includes the struggle for land and 
genuine agrarian reform that ensures that the rights to use and manage lands, 
territories, water, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those who 
produce food and not of the corporate sector. (La Vía Campesina, 2018) 
 
 
 
                                                             
2 In the 1980s international donor funding turned from supporting governments to the increased funding of 
NGOs in the low-income countries. Many of these NGOs claimed to represent the peasantry. This lead 
peasants to form their own rural movements in Latin America to speak for themselves, as they felt not 
represented by these NGOs in their fight against the liberalisation and globalisation of agriculture at that time, 
that was neglecting small scale and family farms. By the early 1990s these movements started to link with 
peasant organizations outside of Latin America. In May 1993 La Vía Campesina was founded in Mons, 
Belgium, as a reaction to the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1986-
1994), and established its first declaration. Since then, LVC has spread across the globe, and represents today 
200 million farmers in 81 countries in Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe (Martínez-Torres and Rosset 
2010; Desmarais 2007; La Vía Campesina 2018). 
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Patel (2009) argues that food sovereignty is too broad and tries to be relatable for too diverse 
actors, but it fails in being clear on what the actual goals of the movement are. Other scholars 
have presented a contrary view of the movement: they consider it to be too specific, to be 
universally adaptable. Shattuck et al. (2015) addresses the issue of contradictions inside the food 
sovereignty movement, as different contexts have different understandings of or implementation 
approaches to the concept. They point out that its definition might not be generic across 
cultures: “The often-cited declarations of La Via [sic] Campesina and others serve as important 
goalposts of this growing movement, but one cannot point to a declaration and say that it 
encompasses all the multiplicity of efforts across geographies equally well” (Shattuck et al., 
2015, p.429). Scholars like De Master (2013) and Mamonova (2018) emphasize by their case 
studies from Eastern Europe, that “history and the character of national identity both play key 
roles in shaping food sovereignty ideas and practices in a given society” (Mamonova, 2018, 
p.195). De Master (2013) discusses the adaptability of the food sovereignty principles for Polish 
small holders and stresses the difficulty of framing a universal peasant identity, as the peasantry 
is not as homogenous as the food sovereignty movement might imply. Schiavoni (2017) argues 
in her study from Venezuela that food sovereignty is a dynamic process that is (re-)shaped over 
time. 
Mamonova  (2018)  explores  how  the  meaning  of  household  farming  and  small-scale 
agriculture can shift through political change. In her research on the relations between patriotism 
and food sovereignty in Ukraine before and after the Euromaidan revolution in 
2014, she explores how “rising patriotism contribute to the emerging discourses on the ‘rights to 
food and to farm’” (p.190), which might trigger a food sovereignty movement in the country. 
The concept of food sovereignty shows many touch points with the narrative of patriotism as for 
instance the understanding of rights to land and to determine one’s food production. She 
concludes that “(...) food sovereignty is a dynamic, open- ended and context-specific process, 
in which meanings and practices of food and farming are being contentiously shaped and 
reshaped over time, as they respond to political, ideological and social transformations in the 
country” (Mamonova, 2018, p.208). 
Following Mamonova’s research in Ukraine, my research aims to look into how agricultural 
actors in the West Bank frame ‘farming’ as a practice and what meaning they align to it. I chose 
to analyse the collective action frames of three different actor groups and to compare how their 
understanding of ‘what they are doing’ aligns or differentiates. Mamonova investigated in her 
comparative study how the Euromaidan revolution influenced people’s understanding of their 
farming practices. Palestine has a long history of resistance against the 
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Israeli occupation, which is closely linked to patriotic aspirations for an independent Palestinian 
state. The standard definition of patriotism conveys it to be love for one’s country. Mamonova 
(2018) refers to Orwell, who is addressing patriotism’s defensive character since the love for 
one’s country is connected to being willing to protect one’s idea of what defines this country 
against others. I believe that resistance is an integral part of patriotism. When I visited the West 
Bank in Summer 2017, I discovered that there are aspirations in the country to link resistance 
with farming practices and thereby create a new meaning of farming. Therefore, the West Bank 
presents an interesting context for investigating how people create meaning of farming as a 
practice and to compare it to Mamonova. Palestine shows similar features as the case of 
Ukraine when it comes to opposing the invasion and/or occupation by another state, and that 
some citizens consider themselves to be more entitled to the land than others. 
Additionally, since some of my informants show a clear link to the food sovereignty movement 
and/or practice ‘quiet food sovereignty’, my research contributes to the discussion on food 
sovereignty being a concept that is dynamic in its meaning from place to place and over time. 
Mamonova (2018) explains quiet food sovereignty to be practices that clearly show similarities 
to the definition of food sovereignty but do not especially define themselves to be part of the 
movement (see p. 192). 
 
 
4. Choice of Informants & Methods 
 
I first came in touch with the topic of farming and food sovereignty in the West Bank when I 
visited a farm in Bil’in (Ramallah and Al Beireh Governorate, Area C) during a two-month stay 
in the Summer 2017. I returned to the West Bank in January 2018 for two weeks to conduct my 
research. My research involved unstructured qualitative interviews and a group discussion, as 
well as participant observation at the aforementioned farm in Bil’in for the whole time of my 
stay. I worked on this organic farm in Area C next to the separation wall to Israel. The 
unstructured qualitative interviews were conducted with the farmer of this farm, as well as with 
the director of the farmers union UAWC and a farmer in the Jordan Valley. Furthermore, I 
conducted a group discussion with farmers in another village of the Jordan Valley. Interviews 
took place in Ramallah and during a field trip to the Jordan Valley. Additionally, document 
analysis was used for contextualisation of the data. 
In the following, the chosen methods and informants for conducting research will be further 
elaborated. 
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4.1. Choice of Informants 
 
The goal of my research was to grasp the meaning of farming for different actors. Therefore, I 
decided to look at different stakeholders and identified three ‘groups’ I wanted to investigate. 
The first group is the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC). It is a bigger 
organisation promoting food sovereignty and is based in Ramallah but works all over the 
West Bank. The union is also the only member of LVC in the Middle East so far and 
therefore brings an interesting touch point between the international food sovereignty 
movement and the local understanding of the concept into the research. Since Fuad Abu Saif is 
the director of the union and has been working for the union even before they started to try to 
become a member of LVC, I consider his understandings of the concept and of what 
UAWC does as significant and will group him and UAWC as one actor. 
My second group consists of farmers in the Jordan Valley in Area C, as actors that have a long 
family tradition in farming in the area. The climate of the Jordan Valley may be ideal for 
agriculture all year around, but the political situation creates one of the hardest environments of 
the West Bank. My information about their perspectives will mostly be based on a focus group 
discussion in Al-Auja and one interview with a farmer in Fatsa’el village. As the farmers live in 
similar settings, they will be treated as one homogenous group. The farmers are a good 
example of peasantry that fits with LVC’s understanding of the concept, and since they have 
always lived in Area C, they have experienced the influence of the occupation over time. All 
farmers come from farming families: their fathers, grandfathers and great grandfathers practiced 
agriculture in the Jordan Valley before them. All the farmers, in Al-Auja and Fatsa’el, were 
members of UAWC, they lived and ran small-scale farms in the area. The farmers taking part in 
the group discussion were all over 40 years old and ranged up to the age of 75, the farmer I 
interviewed in Fatsa’el was in his 30s. 
My third stakeholder is Bubu, the independent farmer that is self-taught in the field of agriculture 
and runs a farm as a political idea. He is originally from Jerusalem, has been living in Ramallah 
for many years now but operates the farm in Area C. He runs the farm with the help of 
international volunteers. I consider his viewpoint interesting because there is a lot of symbolism 
and thought behind his farm and why he taught himself to be a farmer. 
 
 
4.2. Participant Observation 
 
I conducted participant observation during my whole stay. Therefore, I worked on an organic 
farm in the village Bil’in, which is located in Area C next to the separation wall to Israel. The 
work consisted of irrigating, planting, seeding, harvesting, packaging, and preparing lunch. 
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On the other side of the wall you will find the settlement Modiʿin Illit which is constantly under 
construction. The farm was established in the past years with the help of volunteers, which are 
recruited through WWOOF (World-Wide Opportunities on Organic Farms). The farmer Bubu 
used to run the first hostel in Ramallah with his brother and had no farming background. The 
idea of the farm arose from discussions with a long-time hostel guest from the USA with Gazan 
descent. Their idea was to establish the farm out of political motivation and therefore Bil’in was 
strategically chosen. The village is famous in the West Bank for its weekly protest against the 
separation wall and became also well known abroad through the documentary “Five Broken 
Cameras” (2011). They approached a landowner in Bil’in, who became convinced by their idea 
and offered them the land rent-free for a five-year period. 
I visited the farm a few times in Summer 2017 and its concept made me interested into 
farming and food sovereignty in the West Bank. The goal of the farm is to be self-sufficient. 
More aims of the farm will be discussed in the analysis part of this thesis. By conducting a short 
fieldwork on the farm, I wanted to get a better understanding of not only how a farm that aims 
for self-sufficiency works, but also of the conditions in Area C in which people establish a 
farm like this. I was able to experience first hand how the limitation of resources (e.g. water or 
technical equipment) and the constant sound from the construction of the settlement influences 
the working conditions on the farm. 
Participant observation helps the researcher to understand peoples’ perspectives of the world and 
how they understand it (Silverman, 2015). What does it do to people seeing a constant threat to 
the land they consider theirs? How does it feel to see, for instance, the technical advantages 
people can have just a few hundred meters away in the settlement while one struggles to access 
basic tools and resources? The participant observation helped me to contextualise the motives of 
people to aim for food sovereignty. Additionally, it is also appealing to have researched this 
particular farm that is considered by Bubu as an act of peaceful resistance. 
 
 
4.3. Unstructured Qualitative Interviews 
 
Unstructured qualitative interviews were conducted with Bubu, the farm owner of the 
aforementioned farm in Bil’in and with a farmer in the Jordan Valley that is a member of 
UAWC, as well as the general director of UAWC, Fuad Abu Saif. The interviews with the 
different farmers involved their understanding of and expectations from food sovereignty, as well 
as questions regarding their life story, issues with the occupation and what kind of agriculture 
they practice on their farms. I choose to study this particular place, because the 
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farmers in the Jordan Valley have, other than Bubu, a long tradition in farming and different 
perspectives than him. The interview with Fuad gave me an insight into the structure of the union 
and what goals the union has. Overall, these interviews were the most important source regarding 
my research questions, as they give me direct insight in how people reason their actions and form 
collective action frames. I chose an unstructured interview approach since I wanted to give the 
possibility to speak freely and “ascribe meaning while bearing in mind the broader aims of the 
project” (Silverman, 2015, p.166). During the research for my bachelor thesis, I experienced 
that not following a strict question-protocol and leaving the questions open for diverse and 
even unexpected answers enriches the quality of the data in the end. An unstructured interview 
seems more like an informal conversation for the informant and often makes people more 
comfortable to share their perspective. 
 
 
4.4. Focus Group Discussions 
 
A focus group discussion was conducted with a group of farmers in the town of Al-Auja in 
the Jordan Valley. Ten farmers were invited and showed up to the meeting, but there was a 
fluctuation in how many people took part in the approximately 1.5-hour long discussion. I chose 
to conduct a focus group discussion in this case because I was unsure how comfortable each 
participant would feel with answering my questions and since all farmers knew each other, the 
setting in a group might make them feel more comfortable. Group discussions give informants 
the option to contribute by simply follow the discussion until they feel an urge to say something 
themselves. Another benefit of this method is that the researcher can discover different 
understandings of practices and situations. Social norms can be spotted in case the group 
disagrees with the statement of one participant (Hennink et al., 2011). 
 
 
4.5. Document Analysis 
 
Document analysis “is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents“ (Bowen, 
2009, p.27). I used this method to contextualise and deepen my knowledge of the research 
problem. Therefore, I looked not only into academic literature on food (in-)security and food 
sovereignty but also into reports of organizations like La Vía Campesina. These provided me 
with a better knowledge of how food sovereignty is generally understood. 
To analyse the UAWC’s framing, documents by Palestinian research institutions, and 
international and local news coverage regarding the topic were reviewed. 
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5. Ethical Considerations, Self-Reflection & Limitations 
 
I let my informants choose to have their names and place of residence in the thesis or to have it 
anonymised as I do not want them to have negative consequences from supporting my research. 
I informed all participants that the thesis is going to be published online and the implication 
of my research being publicly accessible, in order to make it possible for them to make an 
informed decision. 
 
 
There are a few limitations and/or important remarks regarding me as a researcher in the field 
and the way I conducted my research. First, I am a young German woman conducting 
research in a society in which it is not common in the countryside for a woman to be in 
contact with not-related men, and not to be veiled. Agriculture in Palestine is a male dominated 
field. However, I experienced people to be very open, friendly and tolerant of me choosing not 
to veil myself. Necessary to say is that the men I met were not strongly religious, which 
was expressed for instance by nearly all men being willing to shake my hand, which is not always 
the case in Palestine. 
Second, I am also not able to communicate in Arabic in a sufficient way to conduct interviews in 
the language, hence all interviews were conducted in English. Some of the Jordan Valley farmers 
were not able to speak English and needed assistance of the other farmers and the two employees 
of the union that drove me to the Jordan Valley. As a trained anthropologist I am aware how 
important language is to generate meaning and that meaning is often not translatable from one 
to the other language. It is also clear to me that translations by a professional interpreter would 
have been more reliable than letting the union employees translate what was said. The fact that 
I could not hire a professional interpreter was simply caused by lack of funding for my thesis. 
Third, my research only lasted for two weeks, which is a very short amount of time to get a good 
understanding of the situation. It surely helped me that I had spent two months in the West Bank 
in the Summer of  2017 where I had gotten to know the culture a little bit better and had 
already met some of my research participants. 
That the informants in the Jordan Valley were all members in UAWC and that the union 
facilitated the meetings has to be considered as well, as the union might have had certain 
intentions inviting these particular farmers. However, I got the impression that the farmers 
were not that well informed about the ideas of the union regarding, for instance food sovereignty, 
and that they talked very openly and critically about it. 
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6. Theory: Frame Analysis 
 
To analyse the data, I obtained in the field, the theoretical approach of frame analysis will be 
used. In the following chapter it will be described how I define what a frame is, what is 
framed and how collective action frames are used. Frame analysis as a theoretical approach was 
coined by Erving Goffman (1974) and has since then been developed and extended by several 
scholars. 
 
 
6.1. What is a Frame? 
 
Goffman (1974) defines frame analysis as the examination “of the organization of experience” 
(p.11). Basically, frames come into action when an individual in any given situation answers the 
question: “What is it that’s going on here?” (Goffman, 1974, p.25). People use frames to make 
sense of the world and the experiences they have, based on previous experiences. Framing is the 
process of deploying frames. How one frames, for instance a situation, a problem or another 
person, influences the way one acts upon it (Goffman, 1974). The wide use of frames in diverse 
academic fields has led to different usage and understanding of what constitutes a frame in 
particular. Therefore, it is necessary to point out how the term frame will be used hereafter. I am 
going to focus on frames as knowledge structures/cognitive representations. During my research 
I collected data by interviewing and observing different groups separately. I focussed on how to 
understand peoples’ way to make sense of their practices. Treating frames as interactional 
constructions means to analyse interactions between different groups and/or individuals and how 
they “co-construct meanings while they are interacting“ (Dewulf et al., 2009, p. 160). Even 
though one group discussion (with farmers in the Jordan Valley) was part of the research 
process and during the group discussion the farmers’ developed a joined understanding of 
certain issues, using frames as interactional constructions is not of interest for the analysis 
process. The farmers in the Jordan Valley will be treated as one group with a certain viewpoint 
towards food sovereignty, as they share similar difficulties, life stories and opinions. 
Knowledge structures are defined by Dewulf et al. (2009) as expectations individual’s have 
and are therefore not an interactive process between several individuals but based in the 
individual’s mind: “Cognitive frames are memory structures that help us to organize and interpret 
incoming perceptual information by fitting it into pre-existing categories about reality“ (Dewulf 
et al., 2009, p. 159). As I want to investigate what farming represents and means to different 
actors in the West Bank and how it is defined by them, frames will be treated as knowledge 
structures to analyse the data. 
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6.2. What is a Frame Framing? 
 
Dewulf et al. (2009) mention (1) issues, (2) identities and relationships, as well as (3) 
interaction processes as three categories of what it is that is getting framed. They define 
these categories in the following way: 
 
 
Issue frames refer to the meanings attached to agenda items, events or problems in the 
relevant domain or context. Identity and relationship frames refer to the meanings about 
oneself and one’s relationships with a counter-part(s). Process frames refer to the 
interpretations that disputants assign to their interaction process (Dewulf et al., 
1992, p.165). 
 
 
I will focus on issues (cognitive issue frames) as well as identities and relationships (cognitive 
identity and relationship frames), since farming in the West Bank is related to issues of access 
and ownership but is also strongly linked to people’s identity. As I did not investigate how the 
different groups frame the interaction process in between them, this category will not be used 
hereafter. Throughout my research I observed that the meaning of the issues people face in 
relation to farming are interwoven with how they perceive their own and other’s identity. In the 
analysis of my research data I will therefore focus on the issues people frame and supplement 
the analysis by looking what implications this issue framing has for their identity and relationship 
frames. 
Characterization frames, identity frames, and power frames are the cognitive identity and 
relationship frames I will consider in my analysis. Whereas identity frames focus on the 
individual’s framing of itself and/or its group, characterization frames are descriptions of others, 
and power frames give an understanding of how an individual perceives structures of power. 
Power frames can “differ in terms of the source of the status differences, for example, perceived 
power stems from expertise, resources, membership in coalitions, morality, sympathy, etc.“ 
(Dewulf et al., 2009, p.169). When using cognitive issue frames, I will define the framing 
process similar to the description of collective action frames in the next subchapter: the 
individual has to first categorize an issue as problematic before one reacts (or not) to it (Dewulf 
et al., 2009; Snow and Benford, 1992). 
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6.3. Collective Action Frames 
 
To analyse my field data, I will use Snow and Benford’s (1992) analytical framework of 
collective action frames. Whereas a frame is an individual’s way to make sense of the world 
around it, a collective action frame connects the result of this sense making (step 1) with a 
classification (step 2) and a reaction (step 3). Analysing collective action frames give the 
possibility to link people’s understanding of the world to their behaviour. Snow and Benford 
focus in their definition on framing social conditions from an activist’s point of view. Therefore, 
an activist decides in step 1, if she or he considers a social condition as unjust or not 
(punctuation), and then, in step 2, identifies the origin of the injustice (diagnostic attribution). 
Finally, in step 3, she or he suggests an appropriate way to act upon the problem to resolve it 
(prognostic attribution). Activists form collective action frames by establishing a causal 
relationship between different elements to create a meaningful interconnection (Snow and 
Benford, 1992). However, I am not limiting collective action frames to be useful in analysing 
activists’ behaviour solely as I believe that every individual that is confronted with a problematic 
situation will consider why the situation occurs and how to act upon it. The main difference 
that I believe can occur is that in step 3 the individual might end up deciding not to resolve the 
problem, and in case of wanting to resolve it, her or his actions do not need necessarily to be 
classified as activism. 
I will use collective action frames to analyse how my informants create meaning of farming as 
a practice. I choose collective action frames as the main framework of my analysis, as it is very 
problem focussed and I want to highlight the difficult situation out of which people have to act 
in the West Bank, especially in Area C, when it comes to farming. 
 
 
6.4. Data Analysis Process 
 
To analyse the data, I obtained in the field, I coded my data in three main categories: UAWC, 
Bubu, and the Jordan Valley farmers. Each interview and/or the group discussion was examined 
regarding what issues people cite and what that implies for what their overall issue is 
(punctuation), who they frame is to be blamed for that issue (diagnostic attribution) and how 
they describe what they personally do about the issue, if they try to resolve it or not 
(prognostic attribution). I especially looked into what issue, as well as identity and relationship 
frames their formulations imply. Participant observation and document analysis helped me to 
contextualise my data. Finally, I compared the collective action frames of my informants and 
relate my research data to Mamonova’s (2018) findings from Ukraine. 
 18 
7. Historic, Social and Economic Background of the West Bank 
 
Before I am going to present, analyse and discuss my research data, I will give an insight into the 
historic, social and economic background of the West Bank. The purpose of this 
contextualisation is to make the different social settings, in which my informants live and act, 
more comprehensible. 
The Palestinian occupied Territories (PoT) consist of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Together 
they have a population of 4.55 million (2016) (World Bank, 2016). The Gaza strip claims 
autonomy since 2005 and is governed by the Hamas but still experiences isolation through 
the borders controlled by Israel. The West Bank is under Israeli occupation since 
1967 and is therefore partly ruled by Israel (Area C) and the Palestinian National Authority (PA) 
under lead of the Fatah (former Palestinian Liberation Organisation, PLO). Beside the 
approximately 2.7 million Palestinians, there are about 390.000 settlers living in 132 official 
settlements and 97 illegal outposts in the West Bank (Peace Now, 2018; CIA, 2017). The 
West Bank’s population is predominantly of Sunni Muslim belief (80-85 per cent), around 1- 
2.5 per cent are Christians (Greek Orthodox mostly). The remaining share of the population are 
Jewish settlers (CIA, 2017). 
The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (signed 1995), often referred to as 
Oslo 2, divided the West Bank into three different zones (see Figure 1): 
Area A: Full civil and security control by the PA. Consists mostly of urban areas. 
Area B: Palestinian civil control (PA) and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control. 
Area C:           Full Israeli civil and security control. Constitutes more than 60 per cent of the 
 
West Bank (UN OCHAoPT, 2009). 
19	 
 
 
Figure	1:	West	Bank	Area	A+B	and	C	(UN	OCHA	2011)	
 
 
 
7.1. Historic Background: The Middle East Conflict & Palestinian Resistance Movement 
The conflict between Palestine and Israel, best known as the Middle East conflict, is one of the 
most enduring conflicts of our time. The conflict started out in the 19th century and intensified 
when Israel was founded in 1948. Since then, the region was many times shaken by war between 
Israel and its neighbouring Arabic states. During the Six Day War in 1967 
Israel took control of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights (from Syria). This led 
to Israel gaining control of the Jordan River’s headwaters and significant groundwater 
resources. Over the time of the occupation, laws were put into place to regulate the ownership 
and use of water in the region (Smith, 2013). 
Before I will go over to discuss the implications of the occupation, I want to give a short 
introduction to the more recent Palestinian resistance movement, starting with the First Intifada 
(1987-1993). The Intifada (Arabic for “uprising”) was a protest movement against the Israeli 
occupation. More than 1.000 Palestinians and around 160 Israelis were killed over the six 
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years of conflict that ended with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, that involved PLO 
leader Yassir Arafat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin. This agreement, as well as the 
aforementioned Oslo 2 (1995), set a five-year process between Israel and Palestine and intended 
to give the PA the absolute control over the West Bank and the Gaza strip while Israel would 
withdraw completely from these areas. Thereby, a two-state solution would be implemented. The 
accord was never realized as hardliners and extremists on both sides opposed its objectives and 
hindered the process through attacks and assaults. On the Palestinian side, Hamas was trying to 
hinder the peace process by increasingly committing terror attacks. On the Israeli side, the 
settlement building continued and increased. When in 
2000 the Oslo Accord failed after negotiations in Camp David, the Second Intifada (“Al- 
Aqsa-Intifada“) broke out. It is generally considered to have ended in 2005 after Palestinian 
President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon agreed to stop the violence 
on both sides. Even though it has decreased over the years, violent protest and quelling on both 
sides have remained common until the present day. Justified by security, Israel has been building 
a separation wall around and partly inside the West Bank since 2002 (Morris, 2000; Smith, 
2013).  
 
 
7.2. Socio-Economic & Food Security Situation of the West Bank 
 
In 2016 the Human Development Index (HDI) of the whole PoT was 0.684. This value makes it 
114 out of 188 countries and territories that were measured, and positions Palestine in the 
medium category of the index (UNDP, 2016). The UNDP states that “[t]he poverty line by 
national standards for Palestine, as set by PCBS [Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics] in 
2011, is 2,293 NIS ($637) per month for a family of two adults and three children” (UNDP, 
 
2014, p.53). According to the report, 17.8 per cent of the West Bank’s population live in poverty 
with 7.8 per cent living in “deep poverty” (NIS 1,832 or less per month). Palestine has a high 
fertility rate and its median age is 19.7 years, in comparison to other Arab states or countries of 
the medium-HDI-category, Palestine is doing better in “terms of health outcomes (...), mortality 
rates, child nutrition and life expectancy at birth” (State of Palestine, 2016, p.18). 
In 2013 the World Bank published a report on the potential of Area C to contribute to the 
economy of Palestine. In this report it is stated that the economic activity of Area C is limited 
but that the potential contribution is large: “Area C is richly endowed with natural resources and 
it is contiguous, whereas Areas A and B are smaller territorial islands. The manner in which 
Area C is currently administered virtually precludes Palestinian businesses from investing there“ 
(World Bank, 2013). When addressing agriculture in Area C, the report is seeing the main 
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challenges in the restrictions of land and water use of Palestinians compared to Israeli settlements 
and the limitations to obtain permissions for creating necessary infrastructure. The separation 
wall, which not only surrounds but also draws through the West Bank, has in many cases cut 
farmers off from their land. The high production of the settlements in the Jordan Valley elucidate 
the potential of the land when good access to water is ensured. Around 16 per cent of the West 
Bank’s households were considered to be food insecure in 2014. Major differences in the food 
security status was discovered based on the household head’s occupation, as well as the household 
being located in Area A, B or C. In comparison to all professions listed in the survey, the 
“agriculture, animal breeding and fishing” sector contains the biggest risk for households whose 
head is working in that sector to be severely food insecure. Only households that are relying on 
social assistance and international organisations’ help are more at risk (State of Palestine, 2016). 
Households in Area C are more likely to be food insecure, which correlates with the statement 
that “when less restrictions [of movement] are in place, then the lower the likelihood of being 
food insecure” (State of Palestine 2016, p. 36), as the restrictions of movement are higher in Area 
C. The survey also indicates that more people move out of Area C than move into it, and that it 
is especially food insecure households that move into Area A and B. The MA’AN Development 
Center argues that “food security in the oPt [occupied Palestinian territories] is largely dependent 
on the lack of Palestinian food sovereignty“ (MA’AN Development Center, 2015, p.5). Its report 
states that the Israeli occupation is mainly responsible for the poor state of food security. The lack 
of access to resources like water and agricultural inputs but also infrastructure and international 
trade (import and export) hamper the Palestinian population’s wellbeing. Not being able to access 
these diverse resources is based on administrational power relations (e.g. water resources are 
controlled by the Israeli military since 1967) and lack of free movement for Palestinians. Permits 
are needed to travel outside of the West Bank and therefore to access air and ship transport as 
well as markets. Another issue for the Palestinian agricultural sector and a self-determined food 
system is openness of the Palestinian market for Israeli agriculture products that are cheaper than 
the products produced by Palestinian farmers and therefore make it hard to compete. Beyond that, 
the building of Israeli settlements in Area C is criticised as illegally grabbing land from 
Palestinians and increasing the pressure for land access. This issue is intensified by the fact that 
in about 70 per cent of Area C, construction is prohibited for Palestinians, even when people lived 
and tilled land for decades in these areas. Unemployment, poverty, in combination with the high 
food prices are reasons for food insecurity in the West Bank, but the Israeli occupation is seen as 
the main impediment for Palestinian food security and economic empowerment (UN OCHAoPT, 
2009; MA’AN Development Center, 2015; ARIJ, 2015).  
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8. Analysis of my Research Data 
I will now present the most interesting insights from my research data regarding my research 
questions. Therefore, I will analyse the collective action frames of my three informant groups. A 
focus will be on the framing of issues; however, identity and relationship framing have many 
touch points with how people frame issues in this particular case and therefore will be relevant 
intermittently. 
 
8.1. The Union’s Collective Action Frame 
The analysis in this section is based on an interview from January 14, 2018 with Fuad Abu Saif, 
general director of UAWC, and documents from UAWC’s official website. The interview 
involved Fuad talking about UAWC’s goals and work with agriculture in the West Bank, 
UAWC’s linkage to LVC, the issues of agriculture in the West Bank today and the obstacles 
UAWC meets in its work. 
 
Punctuation 
Punctuating what social condition UAWC’s work revolves around, is best put by the following 
statement from its website: “UAWC was established in 1986 in response to the vulnerable socio-
political circumstance of farmers that resulted from occupation policies in confiscating lands and 
water in the early eighties and therefore directly harmed the interests of farmers and Palestinians” 
(UAWC1, 2018). This statement frames the occupation and its impact on the  lives of  Palestinians 
as  unfair. Fuad asserts a similar picture during the interview, in which he describes food security 
as the main issue of Palestinians today, but that he believes it to be a politically made issue. He 
notes that many partners of UAWC think they have to address poverty and hunger first, but he is 
sure that “[t]he root of the problem is political. We have an occupation, and this means that we 
have no access to our resources, we do not have sovereignty over our resources” (Fuad, 2018). 
Fuad mentions a study by the World Bank, which states that Palestinians loose around four billion 
dollars every year because they cannot use their resources. To him, this is a clear indicator that 
food sovereignty is the issue, as this amount of money would be sufficient to stabilize the 
economy of the small nation. In his opinion, there would be no food insecurity if there was 
food sovereignty in Palestine: 
 
The majority [of farmers in the Jordan Valley], they are losing day after day their 
sovereignty. They cannot decide what to plant, they cannot decide when they have to 
plant, also for example, not the quantity of the water they get, they do not have sovereignty 
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over the border, over checkpoints, over what area they can access or not. So that area 
[Jordan Valley] reflects a very good example when we talk about sovereignty and 
resilience, that it is a political issue, in that area, which is a very important part of 
the West Bank. And where you can smell that there is no sovereignty, and not food 
insecurity. Because, come on, the area is very rich in resources, land is important, the 
climate is very good and important, it is maybe the best climate in all the region, where 
you can plant all over the year, different varieties. But, the problem is the occupation and 
the one that controls the land. (Fuad, 2018) 
 
 
Fuad and UAWC’s official website, put a focus on the occupation’s negative effects on the 
Palestinians’ access to the land and resources. Therefore, I interpret the social condition, that is 
punctuated by the union as the lack of the Palestinian people and especially Palestinian 
farmers to control their resources and therefore their ability to make a living in small-scale 
agriculture. As UAWC works to address this social condition, it is obvious that they consider it 
as an unjust state caused by an unfair political environment. 
 
Diagnostic Attribution 
 
The unions’ punctuation is connected to the union’s diagnostic attribution: who is responsible for 
the lack of freedom? Clearly it is the occupation, and during the interview with Fuad and by 
looking at the union website it becomes apparent that they frame Israel as responsible since 
it is the occupying power and builds the settlements through which Palestinians loose land. 
During the interview, Fuad frames Israel’s actions in Area C as a strategy of forcing people 
out of the area by making life as difficult as possible for them. 
Interestingly, Fuad points out, that it is not only the Israeli settlements in Area C that steal land, 
but that there are also big, state supported Palestinian companies “eating up the land” (Fuad, 
2018) that make it impossible for small farmers to compete. He states that many of the farmers 
in Area C loose their land because it gets confiscated but continue to work as employees on their 
former land. Those who still own their land and produce have to sell their products in bad 
conditions to the bigger Palestinian companies because they do not have the means to market it 
themselves. Therefore, the occupation through Israel is surely still the origin of the lack of 
freedom but rural Palestinian people and farmers in Area C not only struggle with the 
settlements but also better-off compatriots exploiting their miserable situation. This remark 
makes it more apparent that UAWC is representing the economically weak part of the Palestinian 
population that lives in Area C and has no rights or means, the part of the population that is 
mostly based in agriculture. This focus on rural Palestinians reflects also the mission of 
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UAWC: “Effectively contributing towards empowering farmers and their families and 
enhancing their resilience (...)” (UAWC2, 2018). The claim of the union to represent Palestinian 
farmers is similar to how the food sovereignty movement presents itself as the voice of the 
peasantry. UAWC frames itself in an opposition to the power system established through the 
occupation. 
 
 
Prognostic Attribution 
 
The aforementioned mission is also linked to what I analyse to be UAWC’s prognostic 
attribution to resolve the problem: building food sovereignty in the Palestinian territories. 
More in-depth, building food sovereignty means to the union what they summarize in their 
objectives. These include improving the livelihoods and protecting the rights of small farmers 
while also making small farms an important contributor to national food security; “[c]ontribute 
to preserving and protecting the natural resources of Palestine” (UAWC3, 2018). Furthermore, 
the union aims to be transparent and able to provide their services in a flexible but durable manner 
(UAWC3, 2018). Fuad (2018) mentions that UAWC provides different techniques as well as 
local seeds from the unions’ seed bank in Hebron to the farmers to strengthen and protect their 
livelihoods. He also explains that they give support when it comes to legal issues connected to 
demolitions and land grabbing. Organic farming is currently not a priority because the resources 
and techniques needed for this are simply not accessible at the moment 
in Palestine. Their main focus regarding that issue right now is to encourage the farmers to use 
less chemical fertilizer. The union also works on spreading awareness of the issues of farmers 
in Area C, among the Palestinians in area A and B but also to the PA, as they believe that Area 
C is often neglected: 
 
 
We have to be honest with ourselves. (...) As Palestinians we do not do a good effort 
sometimes and we have to plan for the future. It is an area [Area C] we should focus on, 
and not leave it as it is. (...) There is no planning actually for that area, they ignore 
that area because of they have this [Oslo] agreement. (...) If you compare Jordan 
Valley now and before ten years, there was a huge difference. (Fuad, 2018) 
 
 
 
Even though Fuad mentions these critical remarks in the direction of the PA, the unions’ identity 
frame is still strongly linked to a patriotic idea of enabling Palestinians to become independent 
from the occupation through Israel. Fuad is optimistic that, if all Palestinians would pull 
together when it comes to food sovereignty, it would lead to independence: “We have to keep 
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struggling through the occupation until we achieve our freedom” (Fuad, 2018). It just appears 
that Fuad does not consider the PA as a helpful or supportive partner in this struggle, as 
their hands are tied through agreements with Israel. Fuad’s patriotic ideas also become clear 
when he is discussing the issues of Israeli land grabbing and settlement building in Area C: 
 
 
How they [the settlers] are dealing with our land. What are they doing here? Why do 
they have the right to go everywhere? Have access to every resource? But the 
Palestinians that live here for thousands of years, they don’t have. It is injustice, of 
course. (...) But finally we know it’s the Palestinians’ land. (Fuad, 2018) 
 
 
Especially when Fuad discussed these issues in the Jordan Valley, it became apparent how the 
idea of building food sovereignty is linked to the idea that Palestinians have the historical 
right to practice agriculture in that region as he calls the Jordan Valley the “basket of food for the 
Palestinian people” (Fuad, 2018). 
 
 
The prognostic attribution of the union also reflects in their relationship to the biggest food 
sovereignty movement in the world, La Vía Campesina (LVC). After an over ten years process, 
UAWC became the first member of LVC in the MENA region in late 2017. For the union, joining 
LVC had a strategic reason to support their aims and to improve their expertise of useful 
agricultural techniques.  Fuad considers the membership in LVC’s worldwide network as a way 
to support their case by providing attention outside of the region they would maybe not get 
otherwise: 
 
 
(...) once we go globally, I’m not saying it will khalas3 be finished, but it’s very 
important. Because the Palestinian case is a human case, and it means to refuse an 
occupation, it’s the same for me and for you, as a human. (Fuad, 2018) 
 
 
UAWC wants to re-establish local farmer committees like most rural places had back in the days. 
These were actually the origin of the union but got lost when more and more people left 
agriculture. Fuad considers UAWC being based in these local committees to be like the structure 
of LVC. However, it seems like these committees are supposed to work in a certain way from 
the unions’ perspective: 
 
                                                             
3 Khalas means in Arabic to be done or to be finished 
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We believe that the most important thing is that the farmers should work collectively, 
not individually, their impact is like this so much bigger. And we have to link it to a 
national movement, to organisations that believe in the Palestinian rights.  (Fuad, 
2018) 
 
 
 
This statement reveals clearly a certain agenda the union wishes the farmers to follow on the 
ground, when it comes to decision-making and taking actions. Hence, the union’s approach 
cannot really be considered bottom up as it is clearly encouraged from above. 
 
 
Summary 
 
Summarizing, it can be said that UAWC in the West Bank develops a collective action frame to 
address the lack of control of their resources in order to build a self-determined stable 
livelihood through small-scale agriculture. This lack of freedom is in the union’s view caused by 
the occupation through Israel and the associated inability of the PA to support Palestinians in 
Area C. UAWC considers self-sufficient farming, based on the idea of food sovereignty, as the 
solution to claim back the Palestinians’ control over food by supporting farmers in legal matters 
and to strengthen farmers’ expertise in local, self-sufficient food production. The union is 
the only member of LVC in the Middle East and frames itself to be a grass-roots organisation 
in the manner of LVC, representing the demands of Palestinian small-scale farmers.  
 
8.2. The Jordan Valley Farmers’ Collective Action Frame 
 
The analysis in this section is based on my group interview in Al-Auja village as well as the 
single interview in Fatsa’el village I conducted on January 16, 2018 in the Jordan Valley, 
Area C of the West Bank. 
Both, the group discussion and the interview, started by the farmers telling me about the sizes 
of their land, what they cultivate, and then focussed on changes they experienced over the 
years, their explanation for and response to these changes, and their expectations from the 
union. 
 
Punctuation 
The farmers experienced similar issues that they experienced mostly as changes of their 
working and living conditions that influenced the way they practice farming today. Mostly, 
these changes were reported in comparison to the late 1990s and early 2000s, but some 
farmers referred even to prior-occupational times, hence prior 1967. In the following, I have  
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Figure	2:	Farms	in	Fatsa’el	Village	©	Mascha	 Johanna	Wendler,	 2018	
 
summarized the five main changes and issues the farmers reported: 
1)  Lack of resources like water and certain, more qualitative fertilizer. In both villages, the 
farmers complained about the limited amount of water they receive from the Israeli water 
company Mekorot (it only provides households with drinking water for domestic use, not 
industry or agriculture) and the limited possibilities to get access to groundwater and/or 
springs in the region, as they do not get permits for digging, and springs are foremost used 
by the Palestinian families that own them for their own demand. The lack of water supply is 
why the farmers mostly have to buy additional water. Several farmers pointed out that they 
used to cultivate bananas, but the lack of water makes it impossible now. They were also 
complaining that they are not allowed to use certain fertilizers anymore because of its alleged 
bad influence on the environment but Israel and the settlers still use these fertilizers. They 
now use mostly organic fertilizer or buy the products from big Palestinian companies. 
2)  Decreasing and limited access to their land. The land of some of the farmers is located on the 
other side of a check-point or close to a settlement. Out of security reasons they are only 
allowed to access their land during hours set by the Israelis or sometimes not at all. In 
Fatsa’el the village lost 3/4 of their original farmland to the nearby settlement. 
3) Limited access to affordable labour. Over time many families lost their land to the 
28	 
settlements, some left the region towards the North. There is less labour for young men in the 
region, some farmers reported that their sons or neighbours work on the farms of the 
settlements now, since they receive better wages there. 
4)  Lack of access to markets and high competitiveness. Back in the days they exported their 
products to for instance Jordan. This is not possible anymore because of the Israelis 
controlling the cross-border trade. They cannot compete price-wise with Israeli products, 
Israeli “B class” products are dumped on the Palestinian markets and are still cheaper than 
local products. 
5)  Lack of technology and/or permits to advance their farms. The farmers know about more 
sustainable technologies (e.g. rain fed agriculture) that would help them to become more 
sovereign, but they have a lack of material as well as financial means to advance their 
farms. They expect support from UAWC. Additionally, it is a very risky investment, as 
construction permits are difficult but necessary to get (even for building on their own land). 
Building water pools or a house goes hand in hand with the fear for demolition through the 
Israeli army. 
 
Comprising, I argue, that the social condition the farmers punctuate is their lack of control 
over resources (e.g. water, land, technology etc.) and the general unsteadiness of their situation. 
I would summarize the social condition in this case as a lack of control and stability. The farmers 
in the Jordan Valley have a direct comparison to the settlements’ farms that are in much better 
condition than their own, and in connection with their first-hand experience that the 
settlements’ farm land used to belong to them and/or their neighbours. These conditions make 
them complain and consider their situation as unjust. Additionally, the older farmers also 
experienced how the occupation has changed their situation over time. The aforementioned issues 
that they reported elucidate the diverse injustices they associate with the occupation. 
 
 
Diagnostic Attribution 
 
It might seem apparent that their diagnostic attribution (identifying the origin of the injustice) is 
Israel, since Israel’s occupation of the West Bank brings all these regulations and power 
enforcements along and has had a limiting effect on the farmers’ situation over time. The 
occupation by Israel is surely the main reason and thus I do not want to disclaim these 
assumptions. I want to add that there is another actor that the farmers also hold liable for their 
poor situation: the Palestinian Authority (PA) for being absent in Area C. Surely, this absence is 
an outcome of the Oslo agreements and therefore also an outcome of the occupation. However, 
I believe it is important to take into consideration that the state is in the farmers’ daily experience 
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the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, since the PA is not present to 
support them in their daily struggles. The way the farmers describe their situation does not reflect 
any active resistance. Even though they are very aware of the problems the occupation creates 
for them, they do not show aspirations to protest against it directly. 
 
 
Prognostic Attribution 
 
The farmers do not seem to believe that their situation can be changed. When I asked them what 
they think of the concept of food sovereignty that UAWC promotes, they frame it as an absent 
concept, something that may have  existed in the past but is not achievable in the current 
situation. “We cannot control our resources, we cannot control the market, so this word 
you’re asking about, it’s not for me,” the farmer in Fatsa’el answered (farmer in Fatsa’el, 
2018). His answer reflects quite well what the other farmers expressed. Sovereignty is a wishful 
thought for the farmers in the Jordan Valley, but it does not exist in their reality. It is a concept 
that was lost a long time ago and they see no potential and/or possibility for opposing the 
occupation. 
However, they have developed a way that seems in their understanding appropriate to maybe not 
resolve, but to manage their difficulties. The farmers certainly developed coping strategies to 
handle the situation: using organic instead of the conventional fertilizer; tilling only parts of their 
land that they have sufficient water and irrigation systems for; working on the settlements’ farms 
to generate a better income; and also, being a member of UAWC can all be considered to be 
ways of coping with the situation. They surely do not change the overall issue of the 
occupation, but for instance the membership in UAWC diversifies the risk of investing in 
new constructions and technologies for them. UAWC is probably the closest to represent a way 
of resolving their issues, as they provide support that the PA cannot and/or does not provide. 
However, the farmers’ framing of sovereignty reflects that there is no belief from the farmers’ 
side and/or no proper information given from the unions’ side on what the union tries to achieve. 
When I asked during the group discussion, what the farmers wished for from UAWC, the 
discussion became much more active and the two representatives of UAWC were subject to lots 
of demands the farmers had. Their membership in UAWC appears to be rather a means to an 
end to cope with their struggles then an actual belief in the overall goal of working for food 
sovereignty, as it appears as an unachievable concept to them. This also appears to be true for 
how they frame farming: it is a tradition in their families and the region and they surely take 
pride in their livelihood. However, especially for older farmers it is the best way to support their 
families and not a politicaly motivated act. Many mention that their sons work in the settlements 
but that also many moved to the city for education and work. There is an apparent hopelessness 
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in the area for how the farms will be run in the future as the pressure for land and the emigration 
of important labour force to the cities grows. 
 
 
Another observation I made was, that when I asked for the size of the farmers’ land or what they 
were growing on their land, they talked about the whole agricultural area of their villages and not 
of what they individually own and cultivate. The same collective thinking was visible when they 
discussed their issues and changes over time in the region. Often farmers that were obviously not 
in the age to remember certain events talked about these events as something that happened to 
them. Also, when I asked about something more specific e.g. if they personally experienced 
demolitions through the Israeli army, they were agreeing even though it were actually their 
neighbours, whose assets were demolished. This non-individualistic framing of ownership and 
experiences could be interpreted as a strong collective frame. This might be only the case in 
these villages and could have a long cultural tradition, but I would interpret it as an indicator, 
that people frame themselves as a collective because they delimit themselves from another group 
of actors and see a need of building a strong collective sense in their group. I have already 
discussed that the farmers cannot rely on the PA to represent their interests when it comes to 
issues with the occupation, they are rather at the Israelis’ mercy. I interpret the strong collective 
identity in the Jordan Valley villages as being connected to the framing of power of the local 
people. As there is no superior organisation on the state level that could advocate their rights, 
they had to build a strong sense of solidarity in the community to emphasize that it is all of them, 
who struggle with the same issues. I believe there is the possibility that UAWC takes over this 
representative task, but this development seems rather linked to expectations regarding support 
and needs the farmers have on the union. The farmers framing reflects how they consider 
themselves to be part of a certain group, how it is their group being unfairly treated and that 
they originally had the control of the land and the resources. They seem to frame themselves 
more as part of this specific group, whose rights need to be represented, than as advocates for all 
Palestinians. Their framing appears to be more focussed on their direct environment and not 
focussed on Palestinians that do not live in the region and that do not work in agriculture. 
 
 
Summary 
 
Summarizing, the farmers in the Jordan Valley frame their collective action frame to address 
their lack of control and security. This lack is caused by the occupation through Israel and the 
associated inactivity of the PA in Area C. The farmers are not visionary or ideological about 
their situation. They seem to accept that this is the situation they have to deal and cope with if 
they want to survive as farmers in Area C. They certainly developed coping strategies, and their 
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membership in UAWC can be considered as one of them, since the unions’ services spread 
the farmers’ risks and reduce the negative impact of the occupation. It does not seem like the aim 
for food sovereignty of the union is significant to the farmers. 
 
 
8.3. The Om Sleiman Farm’s Collective Action Frame 
The analysis in this sub-chapter is based on an interview with Bubu4, the independent farmer of 
the farm in Bil’in, on January 20, 2018 and a two weeks participant observation period on 
his farm in January 2018. My observations from the farm will be used in the analysis of Bubu’s 
prognostic attribution. 
 
 
Punctuation 
 
Bubu started the Om Sleiman Farm with a partner in 2013/2014. They both met when the 
partner, an US-American with Gaza origin, stayed in the hostel of Bubu and his brother in 
Ramallah. They became friends over time and discussed the issues of the Palestinians living in 
the West Bank, that Bubu summarized the following way: 
 
 
Everything is controlled by the Israeli army. We don’t have the right to control our 
resources, the water as a resource for example, 80% is controlled by the Israeli army, 
all the food that we’re having is coming from Israel, it’s kind of like a dumpster actually 
or the garbage bin of Israel that is happening inside the West Bank and we have zero 
control of that. And how Israel is actually winning because we’re the main supporters 
of the Israeli economy, and it [Israel] is pushing us away from living inside of Area C, 
where it controls more and more the demographics. (Bubu. 2018) 
 
 
This statement of Bubu is punctuating the social condition that needs to be addressed in his 
opinion as the Palestinians’ lack of control over resources and their enforced dependency on 
Israel. Palestinians do not get the chance to access and use the resources of the land. At the same 
time this lack of access forces Palestinian farmers on the one hand to work for the Israelis 
or buy inputs from them. On the other hand, it leads to Palestinian consumers lacking access to 
Palestinian products, as Israeli products are often cheaper and more easily available on local 
markets. In Bubu’s view Israel hinders Palestinians from supporting themselves and pushes them 
towards a dependency on Israel. 
 
 
                                                             
4 Bubu is the farmer’s nickname, he prefers not to be named with his real name, but he agreed to give the 
full name of the farm and the location. 
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Diagnostic Attribution 
 
Diagnostically Bubu attributes the issue of Palestinians’ lack of control over resources and 
their enforced dependency to Israel, occupying the West Bank, as Israel enforces this system by 
using its power in the area. Bubu believes that Israel follows a certain agenda with their actions 
in the West Bank: “Simply, they don’t want Palestinians to live in this area, which is the majority 
of the West Bank, 61%. They want to push them away, confiscate more land, confiscate more 
resources, stop the freedom of movement of the Palestinians” (Bubu, 2018). Israel’s politics 
have pushed people out of farming. According to Bubu, two decades ago half of the population 
was working in farming but today it is only three per cent. 
 
 
Prognostic Attribution 
 
Bubu and his partner developed the prognostic attribution of building an organic farm that 
does not need any inputs from outside and is financially only depending directly on Palestinian 
families, that buy a share and receive in return a basket of vegetables on a weekly basis 
(community supported agriculture). They believe that when people get the possibility to access 
locally produced organic food, they do not need to buy Israeli products. In the beginning, eight 
families had a share. Today there are 15 families from Ramallah area receiving vegetables from 
the Om Sleiman Farm. The farm consists of five sections that in total comprise 54 beds. For the 
future, Bubu wishes to add different channels to the farm: fruit trees (some are already planted), 
chickens (for fertilizer), food-processing techniques (e.g. apple cider, vinegar, pickling, drying 
fruits and vegetables), vermiculture and seed saving. 
So far, the farm is not completely self-sufficient and considering that the techniques to use 
rain fed agriculture are too expensive, water will most likely stay a running cost. However, Bubu 
is planning to introduce water saving techniques like covering the beds to minimize the 
evaporation (Bubu, 2018). 
Bubu intends the farm to go further than just to provide families with organic vegetables: 
“We’re not having food only for our bellies, but for our souls. There is a message behind the 
farm, it is not only food to feed ourselves” (Bubu, 2018). From 2019 onwards, the farm is 
supposed to be “a kind of school, to teach farmers again how to go back to their farms, how to 
deal with demolition orders, at minimum cost” (Bubu, 2018). Bubu’s vision is that everyone can 
set up a farm like his without being dependent on funding from outside. Even though he likes 
the idea to be “unified as Palestinians”, he does not want to be a member of UAWC since 
they depend on funding from abroad: “When you start depending on funding, I don’t think it’s 
independence. And I think if we as Palestinians want to be independent, this is the first step to 
having your own food, your own resources, and then you can actually be stronger towards your  
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Figure	3-5:	The	Om	Sleiman	Farm	©	Mascha	 Johanna	Wendler,	 2018	
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independence” (Bubu, 2018). The farm is apparently meant to be a political and cultural symbol, 
a way of reuniting Palestinians with their land and therefore with their roots in agriculture and 
using these roots as a way of striving for independence. 
 
For Bubu it seems to have an identity-establishing impact to work on the farm: 
 
 
 
I worked in many things, I worked in offices, I worked in high positions, I feel like I’m 
more human when I’m working as a farmer, you know, it’s more delivering a message, 
than when I was a salesman. I’m really happy to do that and I can’t think of anything 
actually stronger than working on the farm. (Bubu, 2018) 
 
 
This meaningfulness, Bubu ascribes to his work as a farmer, seems to be rooted in a strong 
attachment to what he considers to be a root of Palestinian culture and politically a way of finally 
achieving independence from Israel. He strongly identifies with the values behind, the aims and 
the symbolism of the farm. The aspirations as well as the practices of how the farm is run by 
Bubu correlate with the pillars of the food sovereignty movement. Since he does not openly link 
himself to the movement, I would consider the farm to be a sort of quiet food sovereignty. 
Interestingly, Bubu does not match absolutely with what e.g. LVC considers to be a peasant. 
However, he clearly identifies with the roots of Palestinians in peasant agriculture to which he 
wants to return with his farm. 
Even the location of the farm, Bil’in, carries a lot of symbolism since it is one of the most famous 
villages of the Palestinian (non-violent) resistance (Bubu, 2018; Al Jazeera, 2015). The farm 
is located a few hundred meters from the separation wall and the settlement Modiʿin Illit, which 
is constantly under construction. During my participant observation on the farm I experienced 
the threatening atmosphere of the place. Everyday on our way to the farm we passed a nearby 
gate in the wall that is completely black from being burned during one of the weekly protests 
against the wall (see Figure 6 and 7). Every Friday we saw Israeli soldiers entering through this 
gate to walk to the weekly protests that now take place a few hundred meters down the wall from 
the gate, a spot not visible from the farm. However, we could hear the sound of rubber bullets 
being shot and see tear gas clouds rising during the protests. 
During workdays5, not only the construction of the settlement was a constant backdrop of 
sound, but also the settlement’s school played for the start and end of each break a short melody  
 
 
                                                             
5 In Israel and Palestine the first day of the working week is Sunday. Friday and Saturday form the 
weekend. As the farm needs to be irrigated on a daily basis, we spent time there every day. 
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Figure	6:	The	burned	gate,	perspective	 from	the	farm	©Mascha	 Johanna	Wendler,	 2017	
 
 
Figure	7:	The	burned	gate	from	nearby	©	Mascha	 Johanna	Wendler,	 2017	
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from children songs. It felt very disconcerting to work around the lack of resources on the farm, 
as for instance the shortage of water or not having any advanced technology, and to see at the 
same time, how people in the settlement seem to have a very comfortable life. Nonetheless, it is 
in a way understandable why Bubu and his partner chose to have the farm here in this difficult 
location. The farm appears like a spot of greenness and fruitfulness in its dry surrounding, it 
looks like a little spot of hope in a very hopeless place. I believe having the farm in Bil’in 
does not only resemble a symbol of hope for Palestinians by demonstrating that you can have a 
farm in the hardest environments of the West Bank but to symbolise by its visibility on the other 
side of the wall that Bubu and his partner are not going to be uninhibited by the wall, the settlement 
and/or the occupation in general (based on my field notes 2018). 
 
 
Summary 
 
The owners of the Om Sleiman Farm punctuate the social condition of Palestinians’ lack of 
control over resources and their enforced dependency on Israel in the West Bank as unfair. 
Diagnostically they attribute this lack of control and the dependency of Palestinians to be 
caused by the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. As a prognostic attribution to these issues 
Bubu and his partner developed the idea of establishing a self-sufficient, organic farm based in 
community supported agriculture. In addition, there is a symbolic political and cultural idea to 
the farm, as they plan to teach other farmers to establish similar farms all over the West Bank 
and thereby resist the control of and dependency on Israel. Bubu shows a strong identification 
with this symbolic character of the farm. 
 
9. Discussion of Research Data 
 
I will now go over to discuss the main similarities and differences between the collective 
action frames of the three actor groups of my research. All three groups show a similar problem 
framing which involves the occupation through Israel limiting Palestinians access to resources, 
economic stability and independent decision-making and actions. They see a connection between 
the occupation and the bad state of many Palestinian livelihoods. However, the groups relate to 
these problems in different ways. 
The Jordan Valley farmers are directly affected by the problems they frame, and they have to act 
upon them as part of their livelihood. Farming is the base of this livelihood, the farmers need to 
cultivate their land to feed their families. It is that livelihood that is threatened and affected by 
the occupation- Therefore, their prognostic attributions revolve more around coping strategies to 
strengthen this vulnerable livelihood. 
Bubu is framing a more general issue of the Palestinian nation he is acting upon by establishing 
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his farm. The farm puts him into a position where he has to deal with these issues directly. 
Additionally, he is framing farming more as a solution, as he focuses on how farms like his give 
the Palestinian consumer more options to buy food that supports an independent economy and at 
the same time gives Palestinian farmers a possibility to establish a farm that is less vulnerable 
to stresses and risks created by the occupation. His prognostic attribution has many meeting 
points with the concept of food sovereignty. 
Fuad has on the one side first hand experience of the issues through his work at UAWC but also 
refers to general issues of the West Bank power relations and of Palestinians in Area C. His 
and/or the union’s framing shows touch points with the two other groups, since the vulnerability 
of the Palestinian farmers is what they punctuate, similar to the Jordan Valley farmers, but their 
prognostic attribution frames a certain kind of farming that is oriented towards food sovereignty 
as the solution to people’s problems. 
The Jordan Valley farmers show less political ambitions in their prognostic attribution than the 
union and Bubu. For them, farming functions mainly as the foundation of their livelihood that is 
endangered. Bubu’s approach to farming carries more symbolism linked to resistance, 
independence and activism. UAWC is, in the first place, there to represent the interests of the 
farmers to facilitate their working and living conditions, but its ambitions are clearly linked to 
political ideas of patriotism and independence. 
Interestingly, none of the groups frames the PA as an important ally but more as an institution 
that is not able to help them with their struggle, as they cannot operate in Area C and because 
their hands are tied through agreements. 
In the next chapter I will present Mamonova’s research and compare her main findings with my 
previous data analysis. 
 
 
9.1. Relations to Mamonova’s Study in Ukraine 
 
In her research article “Patriotism and Food Sovereignty: Changes in the Social Imaginary of 
Small-Scale Farming in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine“ (2018), Mamonova compares two primary 
qualitative and quantitative studies from 2012 and 2016 among rural households and urban food 
growers in Ukraine. Her comparative study investigated how practitioners of “people’s 
farming”6 have changed their perception of this kind of farming from before and after the 
Euromaidan revolution in 2014. While informants in 2012 were perceiving people’s farming 
mostly to be backward and considered large-scale farming as progressive; the informants of the 
2016 study showed tendencies of a new identification with this traditional farming practice 
                                                             
6 People’s  farming,  hospodarstva  naselennya  in Ukrainian,  is a kind  of “small-scale,  household-based,  
often subsistence farming“ (Mamonova 2018, p.190). 
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connected to the “re-discovery of ‘the lost world’ of national traditions and the popularisation 
of folk (peasant) culture“ (Mamonova 2018, p.195). 
 
 
9.2.1. Claim of Comparability 
 
There are clearly differences in the data collection and analysis, however, I believe that both 
cases show similarities in major points. Mamonova’s research has a bigger scale than my study. 
She conducted a survey and larger amount qualitative interviews. Also, she compares two 
different periods to each other, while my study is a snapshot in time. Her research focusses 
mostly on household farming, while my participants have very different relationships to farming. 
Still, all of my three informant groups deal with small-scale agriculture aiming for subsistence 
and selling. Palestine shows touch points with the case of Ukraine when it comes to opposing 
the invasion and/or occupation by another state (Russia; and Israel), and that some citizens 
are considered more entitled to the land than others. In both cases political ambitions are linked 
to farming and show touch points with the food sovereignty movement. Her theoretical approach 
(social imaginary) is similar to frame theory, as both theoretical frameworks aim to grasp 
people’s viewpoints and how their actions relate to them. 
 
 
9.2.2. Comparison of Findings 
 
I will now go over to investigate how Mamonova’s findings compare to my research data. 
Mamonova presents links of food sovereignty and patriotism in Ukraine. Both, food sovereignty 
and patriotism, carry the idea of certain rights that people have in relation to what they consider 
to be their land, what food they grow and consume, and what kind of farming practices they use 
(see p.194-196). 
The informants of my study fit really well into these similarities of food sovereignty and 
patriotism Mamonova discovered in Ukraine. All informant groups showed clearly that they 
comprehended the land inside the West Bank to be their land, and that it should be them, 
Palestinians working the land and deciding what to grow. The Jordan Valley farmers frame 
themselves as the collective owners of the land and other resources in the area. Several of 
them complain how they used to grow bananas until around ten years ago, but due to the 
water restrictions they had to give up on this crop. The lack of resources hence determines what 
they can grow, not what they actually prefer. 
Fuad mentions the seed bank UAWC runs in Hebron and the value of Palestinian seeding material 
for strengthening the farmers’ livelihood. He also emphasizes how it is Palestinian land that the 
settlers in Area C are using. 
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Bubu focuses on the Palestinian lack of control over the production and consumption of food. 
His framing implies that it is a fundamental right of the people to determine their food 
production and this links to the right to ownership of land and the control of what to grow on 
this land. 
 
Mamonova emphasizes that people’s farming in Ukraine is often a kind of quiet food sovereignty 
as its practices are not part of a special discourse and people take these farming practices for 
granted. However, she also stresses that the aim for smallholder autonomy and for resisting 
neoliberal market structures in agriculture is lacking from the Ukrainian context (see p.194). She 
considers patriotism in Ukraine primarily to be a reaction to foreign aggression (from Russia) 
that has led people to revalue native identity and to aspire self- determination and 
independence. 
Except UAWC, none of my actors used the term food sovereignty directly or referred to the 
international movement. However, Bubu’s farm structure shows contact points with the pillars 
of the food sovereignty movement and could hence be considered to be quiet food sovereignty. 
There seems to be a lack of the aim for smallholder autonomy among the Jordan Valley farmers 
that do not believe to have the means to change their situation without the support from the 
union for instance. Even though the farmers believe in their right to the land and the production 
of food, the bigger ideology behind these beliefs is not apparent. Ownership is foremost important 
out of economic reasons and not out of patriotism.  UAWC openly advocates food sovereignty 
and links to the international movement by being for instance a member of LVC. 
Bubu and the union are convinced that it lays in the hand of Palestinians to empower 
themselves and not to hope for the assistance of the PA. Nonetheless, similar to Mamonova’s 
case, my informants barely show signs of resisting neoliberal market structures. Fuad is the 
only one that directly mentions criticism against industrial farms and companies when he 
blames big Palestinian companies of stealing land from Palestinian small holders that are unable 
to compete. However, all the informants advocate small-scale farming in some form or 
another but did not directly criticize neoliberal market structures. In the case of the Jordan 
Valley farmers it even appears that they would appreciate to be part of these structures since it 
would create a better income for their households. They mention how there used to be 
international trade with for instance Jordan, before Israel started controlling the borders, and 
they framed these trade relations as positive as it created income for Palestinian farmers. 
Mamonova’s assessment of Ukrainian patriotism being an outcome of foreign aggression 
correlates with the case of Palestine whose patriotic aspirations are linked to the resistance 
against Israeli involvement and dominance. Even though the impact of Russia in Ukraine as 
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well as Israel’s in Palestine both go back for at least a century, the Euromaidan revolution and its 
effects are very recent in comparison to the long-term active resistance movement in Palestine. 
Additionally, the way power and influence is manifested and experienced in these two cases of 
foreign aggression differentiates. 
 
 
When comparing her findings from the 2012 study with the data of the 2016 research, Mamonova 
points out some main changes in people’s perception. In 2016 her informants showed greater 
tendencies to value peasant and/or native culture higher and appreciated the quality of home-
grown food. Connected to that, smallholders were considered to be not only important for 
national food security, but also as a driver for making Ukraine become “the breadbasket of 
the world“ (p.202). Back in 2012 small-scale agriculture’s role was often downplayed and the 
“Soviet belief that ‘big is beautiful’” (p.193), hence that industrial agriculture was the most 
desired and relevant for national food security, was still noticeable. In 2016 large-scale land 
investments are often seen as ‘land grabbing’ and people were more critical towards agro-
businesses and its linkage to the state. 
The valuation of peasant and/or native food culture is also what resonates with the reasoning of 
why my informants practice farming. The union as well as Bubu consider small-scale agriculture 
as traditionally Palestinian and relevant for national food security. Fuad even uses a similar 
metaphor, when he describes the Jordan Valley to be the food basket for Palestinians (see page 
18 of this thesis). The Jordan Valley farmers might not link that much symbolism to their 
profession, however, they clearly take pride in it and identify with being farmers and part of 
their community. While healthy, organic food is important for Bubu, organic farming is relevant 
but hard to achieve from the union’s point of view. The use of organic agricultural practices is 
not voluntary for the Jordan Valley farmers but more an outcome of regulations. The Ukrainian 
criticism of agro-businesses correlates with Fuad’s aforementioned comments on Palestinian 
industrial farms (see page 34 of this thesis). 
 
 
Another observation that Mamonova made is that before the Euromaidan revolution, people were 
quite hopeless, especially on the countryside where many villages were ‘dying’ because of the 
lack of younger generations. People tended to be nostalgic for the Soviet times. In 2016 people 
were less wishing back the old times and even associated the Socialist past with corruption and 
economic elites, while the new democratic aspirations were linked to be in the interest of 
smallholders and made people hopeful. The informants showed an overall increasing mistrust in 
the state but at the same time many still hope for more state support. 
Nonetheless, the absence of state support strengthened informal economic structures. However, 
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civil society was long time considered to be weak in Ukraine, especially on the countryside. 
In 2016 a stronger sense of being one nation was noticeable and people were more convinced 
about the fruitfulness of protesting for their rights. Overall, Mamonova considers the lack of 
aspirations for autonomy among the smallholders as one of the main hinders of a food 
sovereignty movement in Ukraine (Mamonova 2018). 
Comparing these findings of Mamonova to my research, it is interesting that her data of 2012 
correlate with how the Jordan Valley farmers think back nostalgically of previous times and tend 
to be pessimistic about the social and economic situation in their villages, while Bubu and 
UAWC correlate better with the new optimism of the 2016 data. Furthermore, Mamonova’s 
informants increasingly mistrust the state but even though my informants do not have high hopes 
for the PA’s interference and help, they link the state’s inactivity to the difficult political 
situation and are less reproachful. Finally, civil society is strong in Palestine and people have a 
long tradition of fighting for their rights. However, the farmers in the Jordan Valley refer 
foremost to their own community and/or local area, whereas Bubu and UAWC link more to the 
overall Palestinian people. 
 
 
Summary 
 
Overall, it can be said that there are many similarities between the linkage of farming, food 
sovereignty and patriotism between Mamonova’s research in Ukraine and the framing of my 
informants. My research groups have a similar understanding of rights to land and determination 
of food production for themselves as well as a valuation of native food culture. Bubu practices 
some kind of quiet food sovereignty, while the union is open about this goal. The Jordan Valley 
farmers do not show sufficient correlations with the concept of food sovereignty to be 
considered quiet. All informants are not really critical towards liberal market structures. 
Differences between Mamonova and my case lay in how foreign aggression is manifested, the 
strength of civil society, and the aims for autonomy among my informants. The idea of resistance 
is more established among my informants and in Palestine in general, this also correlates with 
the stronger wish for being autonomous. However, the Jordan Valley farmers show less 
ambitions for resisting the conditions of the occupation and to aim for autonomy. They are also 
more pessimistic about the situation in their villages which correlates more with Mamonova’s 
pre-Euromaidan findings, while Bubu and the union frame a more hopeful picture similarly to 
Mamonova’s 2016 findings. 
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10. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I investigate the collective action frames different agricultural actors in the West 
Bank have developed in relationship to the practice of farming. I analyse the data of the three 
main informant groups. These three groups are allocated as follows: (1) Fuad Abu Saif as a 
representative of the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC), an interview with 
him is combined with the information from the union’s website; (2) Bubu, an independent 
farmer in Bil’in; and (3) several farmers in two villages of the Jordan Valley. All three groups 
show a similar problem framing which involves the occupation through Israel limiting 
Palestinians access to resources, economic stability and independent decision-making and 
actions, and therefore people’s ability to farm and trade their products. All of them see a 
connection between the occupation and the bad state of many Palestinian livelihoods. UAWC 
and Bubu show aspirations of resistance against the occupation in their collective action frames, 
since they believe that autonomous farming will support the overall political independence. The 
Jordan Valley farmers rather struggle with the impacts of the occupation on their livelihoods 
therefore they have developed different coping strategies to strengthen their weak livelihoods. 
The aim of this thesis also is to contribute to the discussion around the dimension of local context 
in food sovereignty, as the idea of food sovereignty shows many touch points with patriotism 
and has found an echo in the Palestinian resistance movement. This is why I compare the 
aforementioned findings with Mamonova’s research (2018) on food sovereignty and patriotism 
in Ukraine. I analyse that Mamonova’s informants as well as my informants show a similar 
understanding of the rights to land and to determine what to grow, as well as a valuation of native 
food culture. Some of my informants practice some kind of food sovereignty, Bubu quieter while 
UAWC is overt about this goal. In comparison to Mamonova’s interviewees, my informants 
show a stronger understanding of how farming supports patriotic ideas as some define it as a 
form of resistance against the occupation and a way to claim autonomy. For the Jordan Valley 
farmers, farming is part of their livelihood and foremost a practice linked to survival. 
I point out the different meanings of farming for some agricultural actors in the West Bank 
and how the practice of farming can be considered as a base of a livelihood, as a coping strategy 
but also as a way of resistance and chance for political change and autonomy. I thereby give an 
example on how diverse people can make use of farming in a certain context and how the concept 
food sovereignty can be assigned a new meaning in a particular context. I consider this thesis as 
an entry point for further research on the dimension of food
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sovereignty and patriotism in the Palestinian context. As part of the discussion of local 
context in food sovereignty, this research gives some insights into how diverse people relate to 
this concept. The data I obtained in the field searches into people’s diverse viewpoints, but it is 
insufficient to make general statements. Further research could conduct more comprehensive, 
long-term data from other regions of the West Bank. I believe that participant observations at all 
research sites are necessary to entirely grasp peoples’ actions and their framing of it and to be 
able to make assumptions about how the different living conditions of people all over the West 
Bank interact with how they frame for instance the possibility to link farming with resistance. It 
is conceivable that further research could investigate how the particular local settings people live 
in influence their perception of how farming can be used in a political and more symbolic sense. 
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